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Abstract. In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combi-
nation of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a
fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid for an uncertain
supply of excess resources. Standard market environments suggest that
an optimal design uses just one type of market. We show the prevalence
of a dual market system can be explained by heterogeneous risk attitudes
of customers. In our stylized model, we consider unit demand risk-averse
bidders. We show the model admits a unique equilibrium, with higher
revenue and higher welfare than using only spot markets. Furthermore,
as risk aversion increases, the usage of the on-demand market increases.
We conclude that risk attitudes are an important factor in cloud resource
allocation and should be incorporated into models of cloud markets.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing allows clients to rent computing resources over the internet to
perform a variety of computing tasks, from hosting simple web servers to com-
puting complex financial models. By offloading these tasks to the cloud, clients
avoid the necessity of procuring and maintaining expensive servers and infras-
tructure. The current market leader in this industry is Amazon who launched its
cloud platform, Amazon Elastic Compute Unit (EC2), in 2006. Amazon uses its
cloud internally for many of its own computations. Additionally, Amazon con-
tracts with large clients who reserve instances of cloud resources for long usage
periods. Due to natural variation in the nature of computing tasks from Amazon
and its large clients, EC2 has a varying amount of leftover computing resources.
Amazon sells these resources to small clients.
This leads to a natural question: how should a cloud provider price its re-
sources to these small clients? The pricing model adopted by Amazon has two
main components: an on-demand market and a spot market. In the on-demand
market, clients may buy an instance of cloud resources at a fixed reservation
price.3 After resources have been allocated internally, to large clients, and to
⋆ Part of this work was completed while D. Hoy was an intern at Microsoft Research.
3 This might more naturally be called a “reservation market” and we switch to this ter-
minology in the remainder of the paper; however we stick to the term “on-demand”
for the current discussion as this is the term used by Amazon.
clients in the on-demand market, extra supply might still remain. This supply is
sold in the spot market. In a spot market, clients place bids for instances, and a
price is set so that the available supply equals the total demand at that price.
Viewed through the lens of microeconomic theory, the persistence of this dual
market is a curiosity at first glance. Indeed, in standard economic environments,
a risk-neutral, expected-utility-maximizing client who desires a cloud resource
should simply buy it in whichever market is expected to have the lower price
– typically the spot market. This suggests all sales should happen in the spot
market, leaving the on-demand market defunct.
That this is not reflective of reality stems from several factors. Most apparent
is that clients are rarely risk-neutral. For example, it is easy to imagine that a
company would have a soft budget set aside for computational costs. They would
then spend freely within the confines of this budget, and extend the budget
cautiously when necessary to meet their computing needs. This type of behavior
suggests a tendency towards risk aversion on the part of the clients. As the
budget is freely available, clients might prefer to “overspend” to guarantee the
required resources at the on-demand price.
We show in a stylized setting that the presence of heterogenous risk attitudes
can explain the prevalence of a combined on-demand and spot market. Specif-
ically, this dual market induces a unique equilibrium in which more risk-averse
customers (e.g., those with higher budgets) buy resources in the on-demand
market and the others bid in the spot market. We show that this equilibrium
outcome outperforms the outcomes achieved by running only one of the two
types of markets on its own in many key objectives.
1.1 Results and Techniques
In order to highlight the impact of risk aversion on the market, we focus our
analysis on a simple setting in which there is only one type of computational
resource being sold (e.g., a server with one core for one hour), and each buyer
demands only a single instance of this cloud resource at any given time4. For-
mally, we assume a continuum of buyers, where the type of a buyer consists of
a value for an instance and a utility curve that maps outcomes (i.e., allocation
and price paid) to payoffs. The utility curve describes a buyer’s attitude toward
risk: for example, a buyer with a soft budget (as described above) would likely
prefer to spend all of their budget all the time than to spend twice their budget
half the time, and this preference is captured by a non-linear utility curve. The
buyer types are described by a joint common prior. We assume the market is
large; i.e., no single buyer has significant impact on the market outcome.
The market works as follows. First, the seller sets a price for on-demand in-
stances. This price should be high enough to guarantee that supply exceeds
4 Of course, this model abstracts away from many reasonable sources of risk aversion
in the cloud, such as clients with diminishing marginal returns for multiple instances,
the cost of prematurely terminating a long-running task. Even ignoring these factors,
our model still generates heterogeneous preferences toward on-demand versus spot
pricing.
demand, motivated by the fact that resources are always available for pur-
chase in on-demand markets in practice. Buyers then realize their types (i.e.,
value/budget pairs) and choose whether to buy in the on-demand market. After
these decisions have been made, the unsold supply receives an exogenous shock,
modeling variation in the demand of large clients. Any remaining supply is then
sold to the remaining buyers at a market-clearing price.5
We prove that this system has a unique (subgame-perfect) equilibrium for
each choice of the on-demand market price. We do this by analyzing the re-
lationship between the spot price distribution and the distributions of clients’
types and corresponding supply and demand. It turns out that the distribution
over spot prices up to a certain value v depends only on the distributions of
clients’ types in the range [0, v], and hence one can explicitly solve for the price
distribution recursively.
This equilibrium satisfies a monotonicity property: agents that are more risk-
averse are more likely to purchase in the on-demand market, whereas agents that
are less risk-averse are more likely to use the spot market. Furthermore, as the
distribution shifts such that agents become more averse to risk (in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance), we show more clients end up buying instances
in the on-demand market and the revenue correspondingly increases. This result
is perhaps intuitive, but it is not obvious: as clients become more averse to risk,
they shift towards the on-demand market and hence both decrease supply and
demand in the spot market. This in turn could cause the spot price to shift either
up or down, which would impact purchasing decisions of all clients. By further
arguing about the equilibrium of the market, we show the shift towards the on-
demand market in fact causes the spot price to increase thereby reinforcing the
shift towards the on-demand market. Therefore, the equilibrium is monotone
with such shifts in the value and budget distribution. This further illustrates the
connection between the on-demand market and risk attitudes.
We leverage our equilibrium characterization to compare the dual market
outcome to the outcome of a spot-only or on-demand-only market. We are in-
terested in the welfare, efficiency, and revenue properties of these markets. The
revenue of a market outcome is simply the sum of the payments, and is equal
to the cloud provider’s utility. The welfare of an outcome is the total utility of
all market participants including the cloud provider. The efficiency is the total
value of the cloud clients, ignoring payments. In risk neutral environments, the
welfare and efficiency are equal, but with risk-averse clients the welfare can be
less than the efficiency.
It is easy to see that a spot-only market is more efficient than a dual market,
which in turn is more efficient than an on-demand-only market. This is because
the spot market precisely generates the efficient outcome, even with exogenous
5 Since our model abstracts away from inter-temporal effects, we do not explicitly
model the impact of fluctuating spot prices and changes to on-demand prices over
time. Investigating a repeated-game model of the market, and/or agents with time-
dependent preferences (e.g., minimizing the cost of a large job subject to a deadline),
is left as a direction for future work.
supply uncertainty: in a spot market, allocation is monotone in value and thus
a lower-valued client is never served in place of the higher-valued one.
Surprisingly, these efficiency comparisons do not extend to welfare. As we
show, the welfare of the dual market is better than the welfare of the spot market
alone, regardless of the price set for the on-demand instances. In particular, this
is true even when the on-demand market price is set to maximize the revenue of
the cloud provider. This is not trivial: the on-demand market adds inefficiency,
since clients with high value but low aversion to risk may not wish to purchase
on-demand, whereas clients with lower value but higher risk-aversion might. This
leads to circumstances where lower-valued clients win but higher-valued clients
lose. However, since the clients that are winning in this scenario are actually more
risk-averse, the transfer of payments to the cloud provider increases welfare. We
show that the welfare increase due to additional transfers from risk-averse clients
offset any inefficiencies in the allocation. Moreover, since this welfare comparison
holds at every setting of the on-demand price, it applies in particular to the price
that maximizes revenue. We show this price must also generate more revenue
than a spot-only market, leading to increases in welfare and revenue.
In summary, a dual spot/on-demand market simultaneously improves both
the revenue and welfare of a spot-only market. We also show by example that
while an on-demand market is revenue-optimal for risk-neutral buyers, a dual
market can generate strictly higher revenue when buyers are risk-averse. Fur-
thermore, while a dual market may sometimes generate less revenue than an
on-demand-only market, a dual market is always more efficient. This suggests
that a cloud provider, especially one that holds a dominant position in the mar-
ketplace, might prefer a dual market system. This phenomenon is driven by
heterogeneous risk attitudes that arise naturally in the context of cloud compu-
tation, leading us to posit that risk aversion is an important element to consider
when one models the cloud marketplace.
1.2 Related Work
A number of papers explore cloud-computing market design. Zhang et al. [17]
consider designing a truthful auction where uncertainty lies in the arrival of de-
mand and value profiles of bidders, whether they have a large job with deadline
or general demand over time. An et al. [2] design a negotiation-based mechanism
for setting price contracts in the presence of demand uncertainty. Borgs et al.
[5] consider the pricing problem faced by a seller setting on-demand prices over
multiple time periods and uncertain supply, with agents who arrive and have
different deadlines for their tasks. The paradigm of a dual spot+reserve mecha-
nism has also received a lot of attention. Wang et al. [16] uses a Markov decision
process to model the designer’s choice of how to partition supply between the
reserve and spot markets. Abhishek et al. [1] models the cloud market as a queu-
ing model, in which a continuum of jobs arrive and have (private) waiting costs.
They find that a fixed cost model provides greater expected revenue than a spot
market. Additionally, recent works [13, 8] have focused on the problem faced by
bidders in such a market: when to use the spot market and when to reserve.
Ben-Yehuda et al. [4] analyzes the expected spot prices in comparison to their
reservation prices, and find that it is very likely that Amazon is intentionally
manipulating the price or supply distribution so as to provide users with more
uncertainty in the spot market. In all of the models described above, agents are
risk-neutral and do not have budgets. As far as we are aware, our work is the
first to use risk aversion to explain the prevalence of a spot+reserve market.
Auctions for cloud computation resources share similarities to electricity mar-
kets, where the split between a spot market and a so-called “futures” market
is common. Indeed, the use of both markets has been advocated to account for
risk-averse buyers and sellers (see e.g., [3]). One difference is that, unlike the
on-demand market for cloud computation, futures markets for electricity are
typically resolved years in advance.
While most work in auction theory assumes risk-neutral agents, some work
has been done for auctions with risk-averse bidders. Optimal auctions have been
characterized for simple settings [9, 11], but the solutions are generally not
expressible in closed form. It is therefore more common to study the simple
auctions used in practice, with the general finding that second-price or spot-
like auctions do poorly for revenue when compared with first-price auctions
[15, 7, 6]. Matthews [12] has looked at the preferences of bidders in the auctions,
and showed that first-price auctions not only can get more revenue than the
second-price auction, but also can be preferred by bidders due to reduction in
uncertainty around the payment. Our model of risk-aversion as the presence of
a soft budget is closely related to the capacitated utilities model of Fu et al.
[6], where the capacity in their model corresponds to value minus budget in our
model. They show that with capacitated agents, a simple first-price auction with
reserve has revenue that approximates the revenue of the optimal mechanism.
Our results are of a similar flavor to the eBay-style buy-it-now auction con-
sidered by Mathews and Katzman [10]. As in our model, they find that adding a
buy-it-now option increases revenue, and as agents become more risk-averse, the
optimal price increases. Their model differs from ours in that they consider an
explicitly randomized allocation rule, rather than clearing the market at a spot
price, in order to incentivize use of the buy-it-now (i.e., reservation) option.
2 Preliminaries
In our model, a single cloud provider (the seller) is selling compute resources to
a continuum of clients (the bidders).
Utility structure. Each bidder i has value vi ∈ [0, 1] for a single compute
instance. As is standard in the economics literature, we model the risk attitude
of bidder i through a utility function ui : R≥0 → R≥0. If the bidder obtains an
instance and pays p, then her utility is ui(vi−p). We will assume that ui(0) = 0,
u′i(0) = 1, ui is continuous and non-decreasing, and that ui is not identically 0.
Note that since ui(0) = 0, we can think of vi as the maximum price at which
bidder i is willing to purchase an instance. A bidder that does not obtain an
instance will pay nothing and have utility 0.
We focus our attention on agents that are risk averse. That is, we will as-
sume that utility curves are weakly concave, as is standard when modeling risk
aversion.We allow ui to be linear, in which case bidder i is said to be risk-neutral.
Roughly speaking, an agent with a utility curve that is “more concave” will
be more risk averse, in the sense that they are more likely to prefer guaranteed
outcomes to uncertain lotteries. More formally, we say that utility function u
is more risk averse than u∗, and write u  u∗, if for every distribution L over
non-negative real values and every fixed value d ≥ 0, if Ex∼L[u(x)] ≥ u(d), then
Ex∼L[u
∗(x)] ≥ u∗(d). In other words, if an agent with utility curve u prefers
a lottery L over a guaranteed payout of d, then an agent with utility curve u∗
would prefer the lottery as well. This defines a partial order over utility curves.
Note that, under this definition, all (weakly) concave utility curves are (weakly)
more risk-averse than a risk-neutral (i.e., linear) curve. Note also that for twice-
differentiable utility curves, u is more risk-averse than u∗ if and only if the
standard Arrow-Pratt measure of risk-averson is nowhere lower for curve u than
for curve u∗ [14].6
Demand structure Types are distributed according to a joint distribution
F on pairs (v, u). For ease of exposition, we will assume throughout that F is
supported on a finite collection of (v, u) pairs. Write V and U for the (finite)
sets of values and utility curves that support F , and for (v, u) ∈ V × U we will
write f(v, u) for the probability that an agent has type (v, u).
We will use F (v) to refer to the induced distribution over values; that is, F (v)
is the probability that an agent’s value is at most v. We will assume a large-
market condition, which is that the aggregate demand is distributed exactly
according to the type distribution F .
Supply structure The supply of instances, q, is unknown to the bidders and
seller until the instances are to be allocated. The supply is then drawn from a
distribution, Q. We will normalize the supply so that q represents the fraction
of the market that can be simultaneously served, hence q ∈ [0, 1].
2.1 Auction Formats
We will consider three auction formats in this paper: spot auctions, reservation
auctions (previously referred to as on-demand), and dual (or spot+reservation)
auctions.
Spot (M s) One type of auction to run is a market-clearing auction, or a spot
auction. In this auction, buyers submit bids. A market-clearing price ps is
chosen such that the quantity of bids exceeding ps is equal to the supply.
Under our unit-demand and large market assumptions, it is a dominant
strategy for a bidder to bid her value; henceforth we assume the bids in
the spot market equal the values. We observe that a market-clearing price
always exists in our market, even in the presence of non-linear utilities: with
6 We define risk aversion with respect to agent preferences directly, rather than via
the Arrow-Pratt measure, to avoid requiring utility curves be twice differentiable.
available supply q, and distribution over values F , the market clearing price,
written ps(q), is precisely
7 the value for which q = 1− F (ps(q)).
Reservation (M r) In a reservation-only (or “on-demand”) market, the auc-
tioneer sets a fixed price pr per instance, in advance of seeing the realization
of supply. Price pr need not be a market-clearing price. If there is not enough
supply to satisfy the demand for instances at this price, the winning bidders
are chosen uniformly at random from among those who wish to purchase.
Spot+Reservation (M s+r) In a spot and reservation market, the auctioneer
first sets a fixed price pr and runs a reservation auction. The remaining
inventory of supply (if any) is then sold via a spot auction. The exact timeline
of events in the spot and reservation auction M s+r is as follows:
1. Auctioneer announces reservation price pr.
2. Bidders realize types (vi, ui) ∼ F (v, u).
3. Each bidder decides whether to purchase an instance in the reservation
auction, indicated by ar ∈ {0, 1}. Let T =
∑
v,u a
r(v, u) f(v, u) be the
total volume of reserved instances.
4. Auctioneer realizes supply q ∼ Q, and reserved instances are allocated
as in the reservation market described above.
5. If q > T , the auctioneer runs a market-clearing auction to clear the
excess capacity. Let ps(q) be the resulting market-clearing spot price.
Note that our specification does not ask bidders to decide whether or not to
participate in the spot market. The fact that bidders are unit demand, and
that the spot auction is truthful under our large market assumption, implies
that in equilibrium bidders will bid (truthfully) in the spot auction if (and
only if) they don’t buy an instance in the reservation auction.
For a given (implicit) strategy profile for mechanism M s+r, we will write
S(ps) for the cumulative distribution function of the resulting spot prices.
Solution concept: subgame-perfect equilibrium. For each of these auctions, the
solution concept we apply is subgame-perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile for a
multi-stage game forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if, at every stage
t of the game and every possible history of actions by players in previous stages,
no agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from her prescribed strategy from
stage t onward.
For the spot auction and reservation auction, there is only one stage of the
resulting game and hence equilibria are straightforward: each agent chooses to
purchase her utility-maximizing quantity of instances given the specified price.
For mechanism M s+r, we can characterize the SPE as follows. In the second
(i.e., spot) stage of the mechanism, the equilibrium condition implies that agents
always purchase instances if and only if their value is above the realized spot
price. Thus, the only strategic choice to be made by agents is in the first (i.e.,
reservation) stage of the mechanism, where each agent must select whether to
purchase an instance in the reservation market. We will therefore define a strat-
egy profile s to be a mapping from a type (v, u) to an action {0, 1}, where s(v, u)
7 This price may not be unique if q = 0 or q = 1. In these cases we define ps(q) to be
the supremum of prices satisfying the written condition, which will be ∞ for q = 0.
is interpreted as the number of instances to purchase in the reservation mar-
ket. Note that the distribution over market-clearing prices in the second stage
is completely determined by the actions of agents in the first stage, and hence
is determined by s. An equilibrium is then a strategy profile such that no agent
can benefit by unilaterally deviating from strategy s (i.e., by reserving more or
fewer instances), given the distribution of spot prices implied by s.
2.2 Objectives
We consider three objectives when evaluating mechanisms: revenue (REV ), wel-
fare (WEL) and efficiency (EFF ). The revenue of a mechanismM , REV (M), is
the sum of the payments made to the auctioneer. Note that for the spot+reservation
mechanism, REV (M s+r) = prT + Eq∼Q[ps(q)(q − T )] where we used the fact
that T ≤ q with probability 1. The welfare of a mechanism WEL(M) is the
sum of utilities of all agents, including the auctioneer (whose utility is pre-
cisely the revenue of the mechanism). The efficiency EFF (M) of a mechanism
measures the value created, without considering the welfare lost due to the
(non-linear) utility functions of agents. For the spot+reservation mechanism:
EFF (M s+r) = E(vi,ui)∼F [vi · s(vi, ui) + vi · (1− s(vi, ui)) · S(vi)]
If an agent reserves, her value generated is vi. If she does not reserve, her
value generated is vi · S(vi), which is her value times the probability that the
spot price is below her value. Note that if agents are risk-neutral (i.e., have the
identity function as their utility functions), then EFF (M) =WEL(M).
3 Equilibrium Behavior & Analysis
In this section, we analyze the choices of bidders and use this to characterize
equilibrium of the spot+reservation market. We begin by noting the relationship
between the spot price distribution and the distributions of supply, type, and
reservation demand in equilibrium. Recall that Q denotes the CDF of the supply
distribution.
Lemma 1. Fix strategy profile s, let S be the distribution of spot prices under
s, and let T (p) be the volume of reserved instances demanded from agents with
value at most p, under s. Then s forms an equilibrium if and only if, for all p,
S(p) = 1−Q (1− F (p) + T (p)) , and (1)
T (p) =
∑
v∈V
v≤p
∑
u∈U
f(v, u) · 1 [u(v − pr) ≥ Ep∼S [u(max{v − p, 0})]] . (2)
Proof. The probability that the spot price is at most p is exactly the probabil-
ity that the supply is greater than necessary to satisfy all of the demand for
resources from bidders with higher marginal values than p, plus all reservation
demand for resources with lower marginal values than p. On the other hand,
the volume of reserved resources demanded from agents with value at most p,
at equilibrium, is precisely the probability that such an agent will prefer the
deterministic reservation outcome to the lottery over outcomes determined by
the distribution over spot market prices.
In light of Lemma 1, we will tend to equate equilibria with the resulting
distributions S and T , rather than with an explicit strategy profile s.
Lemma 2. Purchasing in the reservation stage is monotone in the risk-aversion
of ui: if a (vi, ui) bidder (weakly) prefers to reserve an instance, then a (vi, u
∗
i )
bidder with u∗i  ui (weakly) prefers reserving.
Proof. We begin by considering the special event in which the agent is not al-
located an instance even if they reserve, due to the supply being insufficient to
honor all reservations and the agent not being selected randomly as a winner. If
this event occurs, the bidder’s utility will necessarily be 0, and this is indepen-
dent of their utility curve and their chosen action (since, if q < T , no agent that
enters the spot market will obtain an instance). It therefore suffices to consider
the agent’s expected utility conditional on the event that the agent will be al-
located an instance with certainty if they choose to reserve. With this in mind,
the utilities of a unit demand agent from reserving or participating only in the
spot market, respectively, are
ur(vi, ui) = ui(vi − pr),
us(vi, ui) = Eps∼S [ui(vi − ps) · 1ps≤vi ] .
We now want to show that ur(vi, ui) ≥ u
s(vi, ui) implies u
r(vi, u
∗
i ) ≥ u
s(vi, u
∗
i ).
Note that, fixing vi, the spot market generates a certain lottery L over values
(vi − ps), and the reservation market generates a certain value vi − pr. Thus,
from the definition of risk aversion, if an agent with utility curve ui prefers the
certain outcome to the lottery L, and u∗i  ui, then an agent with utility curve
u∗i prefers the certain outcome as well.
3.1 Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness
We are now ready to establish uniqueness of equilibrium. One subtlety about
equilibrium uniqueness is the manner in which buyers break ties. If a positive
mass of agents is indifferent between the spot and reservation markets, there
may be multiple market outcomes consistent with those preferences. We will
therefore fix some arbitrary manner in which bidders break ties, which could be
randomized and heterogeneous across bidders. Our claim is that for any such
tie-breaking rule, the resulting equilibrium will be unique.
Lemma 3. There is a unique equilibrium of M s+r. Moreover, this equilibrium
is computable in time proportional to the size of the support of type distribution
f .
Proof. As shown in Lemma 1, the challenge of characterizing equilibrium es-
sentially reduces to characterizing the fraction of bidders who reserve at a given
price, T (p). This is because T determines the distribution S over spot prices, and
S (together with an arbitrary tie-breaking rule) uniquely determines the strategy
profile s, since this can be inferred from the expected utility when choosing the
spot market. Thus, to show uniqueness and existence of equilibrium, it suffices
to show uniqueness of the functions S and T .
We will prove that, for all v ∈ V , T (v) and S(v) are uniquely determined
by the functions T and S restricted to values less than v. The result will then
follow by induction on the elements of V .
Consider first an agent with value v = minV . Recall that the spot price is
always at least v. Thus, if pr < v then the agent will always reserve, if pr > v
then the agent will always choose the spot market, and if pr = v the agent will
be indifferent and apply the fixed tie-breaking rule. In each case, the value of
T (v) is uniquely determined, and thus S(v) is as well.
Now choose v > min V , and suppose T and S are determined for all elements
of V ∩ [0, v). We claim the distribution of the random variable max{v − ps, 0},
where ps is distributed according to S, is then uniquely determined. This is be-
cause the non-zero values of this random variable are distributed according to S
restricted to values in V ∩ [0, v). But, by Lemma 1, this random variable deter-
mines the value of T (v), which in turn determines the value of S(v). Thus T (v)
and S(v) are uniquely determined by S and T on V ∩[0, v), as required. Moreover,
they can be explicitly computed by evaluating the summation in Lemma 1.
3.2 An Example: Soft Budgets
In this section we present a special case of risk-aversion, driven by soft budgets,
and give an interpretation of our equilibrium characterization for this case.
Suppose that each buyer i is characterized by their value vi for a compute
instance and a soft budget bi ∈ [0, vi]. We think of bi as a budget of funds
that has been allocated to acquiring a compute instance. If the buyer obtains an
instance but pays less than bi, the residual budget is lost: it is as if they had paid
bi. On the other hand, if the buyer pays more than bi, they suffer no additional
penalty; they simply incur the cost of their payment.
This scenario is captured by a piecewise linear utility curve, ui(z) = min(z, vi−
bi). Note that if a buyer with budget bi obtains an instance and pays pi > bi
their utility is ui(vi − pi) = vi − pi, whereas if they pay pi < bi their utility
is ui(vi − pi) = vi − bi. For a fixed value vi, an agent with a higher budget is
more risk-averse. To see this, note that if a buyer strictly prefers a lottery L to
a deterministic outcome d, then it must be that d < vi − bi (since otherwise d
must be utility-maximizing). In this case, decreasing the budget can only make
the lottery more valuable, while not affecting the utility from the deterministic
outcome. Thus, a decreased budget can only increase the propensity to select a
lottery over a deterministic outcome.
The monotonicity result in Lemma 2 thus results in a partitioning of agents
that prefer the spot market to the reservation market and vice versa by an in-
value (vi)
b
u
d
g
et
(b
i
)
reserve
∅
spot bI(v)
Fig. 1. With soft-budgets, a monotone-decreasing indifference curve partitions agents
into those that reserve an instance and those who rely on the spot market.
difference curve over budgets. See Figure 1 for an illustration. Any agent with
(vi, bi) below the curve prefers the spot market; any agent above the curve (such
that vi ≥ bi), prefers the reservation market. Lemma 3 shows that this indif-
ference curve is unique, given the distribution over agent types, and precisely
specifies which agents choose to reserve and which enter the spot market.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we first consider the impact of changes to buyer risk attitudes.
We show that as agents become more risk averse, more agents use the reservation
market and revenue increases, for every setting of the reservation price. Second,
we compare the reservation+spot mechanism to the spot market and the reser-
vation market. We first show that the combination mechanism’s outcomes are
more efficient than running a reserve market on its own. We then show that it
generates both more revenue and more welfare than running only a spot market.
Proofs are included in the Appendix.
The results in this section hold under two assumptions on the reservation
price set by the seller. First, we will make the assumption that pr is set high
enough so that, in the resulting equilibrium, Prq∼Q[q < T ] = 0. That is, over
the uncertainty in supply, the mechanism can serve the reserved instances with
certainty. This assumption is motivated by the fact that these instances are
typically viewed as guaranteed by the mechanism.
Another natural and practical property is that the reservation price pr be
set high enough that it will be greater than the expected spot price. That is,
pr is large enough that it is more costly, in expectation, to reserve a guaranteed
instance than to bid for an instance in the spot market.
4.1 Effect of Increased Risk Aversion
We consider the impact of an increase in risk aversion. Consider type distribution
F and a type distribution F+ induced by a pointwise transformation g+(U, V )→
(U, V ) applied to each point in F which weakly increases risk aversion and does
not affect values. Specifically, for any (u+, v+) = g+(u, v), v+ = v and u+  u. In
the following lemma, we show that such a change can only increase the fraction
of agents who choose to reserve, and can only increase revenue.
Lemma 4. For mechanism M s+r, and for any reserve price pr, if risk aversion
of agents increases then the fraction of agents who purchase in the reservation
stage increases, as does the expected revenue of the mechanism.
The intuition underlying Lemma 4 is as follows. The first order effect from a
change in risk aversion is an increase in T , the fraction of users who choose to
reserve at a given price. This increase in reservations translates into higher spot
prices, since it reduces the quantity sold in the spot market. Higher spot prices
in turn cause more users to prefer to reserve, which can only increase spot prices
further. This can be shown by induction over agent values.
4.2 Comparing Mechanisms
We now compare welfare and revenue of M s+r to M s and M r. Here we make
use of the two assumptions discussed in Section 2.1: first, the reservation phase
is not oversubscribed, i.e., the reservation price is set sufficiently high that there
will be sufficient supply to fulfill the demand for reserved instances; and second,
the reservation price is sufficiently high to be above the expected spot price.
We begin by comparing the revenue of the dual mechanism with the expected
revenue of a spot-only market. Note that, trivially, the best revenue of the com-
bined mechanism is at least the revenue of a spot market; this is because, in
the combined mechanism, the reserve price can be set sufficiently high that all
customers buy in the spot market. We show something stronger: for every choice
of reservation price, the revenue of the combined mechanism is at least that of
a spot market run in isolation.
Lemma 5. For any choice of the reservation price satisfying our assumptions,
the expected revenue of the reservation and spot mechanism is weakly greater
than the revenue of the spot-only market.
Proof (sketch). As in Lemma 4, as risk aversion increases, revenue increases for
a fixed reservation price. Fix a reservation price and consider starting with a
distribution of risk-neutral agents. These agents will all bid in the spot market
and thus the outcome (and in particular, the revenue) will be identical to the
spot-only mechanism. By deforming the utility curves of the agents in a manner
that only increases risk aversion, until they match the correct distribution, and
applying Lemma 4, we can conclude that the revenue of the dual market only
increases while the revenue of the spot-only mechanism, which is unaffected by
the utility curves, remains the same.
Example 1. This example illustrates the revenue of the dual mechanism can be
strictly greater than both the spot and the reservation mechanisms. We consider
an example in which agent utility curves are specified by soft budgets, as in
Section 3.2. Recall that a budget of 0 corresponds to risk-neutrality. Take ǫ > 0
to be sufficiently small, and consider the following distribution over buyer types:
– with probability 0.5− ǫ, (v, b) = (5, 0)
– with probability 0.5, (v, b) = (10, 10− ǫ)
– with probability ǫ, (v, b) = (20, 0)
The supply is distributed such that q = 1− ǫ with probability 0.8, and otherwise
q = 0.5+ ǫ/2. In the spot-only auction, the spot price is 5 with supply q = 1− ǫ
and 10 with supply q = 0.5 + ǫ/2, giving revenue of 5 − 3ǫ. In the reservation
market, the optimal reserve price is 10, which generates a total revenue of 5+9ǫ.
Consider the dual mechanism with reservation price 10− ǫ. At equilibrium,
the buyers of type (10, 10− ǫ) strictly prefer to reserve (obtaining utility ǫ with
probability 1, rather than utility ǫ with probability 0.8), whereas the buyers of
type (20, 0) strictly prefer to participate in the spot market (obtaining utility
(20− 5) with probability 0.8, rather than utility 10+ ǫ with probability 1). The
revenue is then 7− 52ǫ, greater than spot-only revenue 5−3ǫ, and reservation-only
revenue 5 + 9ǫ for sufficiently small ǫ.
Lemma 6. For any choice of the reserve price satisfying the assumptions above,
the expected efficiency of the reservation+spot mechanism is weakly greater than
the efficiency of the reservation market with the same reservation price.
Proof. Recall that the efficiency of a mechanism is the expected value generated
by the agents, ignoring the welfare lost due to the nonlinear utility functions.
For any realized supply q then, weakly more people are served in M s+r, hence
efficiency is greater.
Theorem 1. In any equilibrium of the the spot and reservation mechanism
where the reservation price is set above the expected spot price, the expected wel-
fare of the reservation and spot mechanism is weakly greater than the expected
welfare of the spot-only mechanism.
Proof (sketch). Note that, relative to a spot market, introducing a reservation
price adds inefficiency. This is because if a bidder is willing to reserve to get a
guaranteed instance, any time they would not have one in the spot market, there
is a higher valued bidder than them who could be allocated.
However, welfare is increased when a bidder chooses to reserve. Consider an
agent with value vi who is willing to reserve at price pr. Reserving increases
his utility and the auctioneer is receiving more revenue, because the reservation
price is greater than the expected spot price (by assumption).
The full proof consists of three parts. First, we define a benchmark Bs+r
that is just like M s+r except agents who reserve pay the spot price instead of
the reservation price. We then show that the welfare of M s+r is greater than the
welfare of Bs+r, which follows largely because the expected reservation price is
greater than the expected spot price. Finally, we show that spot prices increase
when agents choose to reserve, which leads to the welfare of Bs+r being greater
than the welfare of M s, and hence the welfare of M s+r is greater than M s.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Let F be the original distribution over types, and let F denote a distri-
bution in which the risk aversion of agents increases, for each fixed value v. Let
T and S refer to the volume of reserved instances and distribution of spot prices
under the alternate distribution F . As before, bI , T , and S correspond to the
respective quantities for the original distribution F .
We will show that for any price p ≥ pr, it is the case that T (p) ≥ T (p) and
S(p) ≤ S(p). To see how this implies the lemma, note that these inequalities
imply that the increase in risk aversion of agents results in (a) more agents
reserving, and (b) higher spot prices. Because the reservation price is greater
than the expected spot price, the now-reserving agents pay more than they were
paying before and total revenue increases.
We will prove the desired inequalities by induction on p ∈ V . Note first
that for any p < pr, an agent with value p will certainly choose to purchase in
the spot market regardless of their risk attitudes, and hence T (p) = T (p) and
S(p) = S(p). For any p ≥ pr, recall that
T (p) =
∑
v∈V
v≤p
∑
u∈U
f(v, u) · 1 [u(v − pr) ≥ Ep∼S [u(max{v − p, 0})]]
and
T (p) =
∑
v∈V
v≤p
∑
u∈U
f(v, u) · 1
[
u(v − pr) ≥ Ep∼S [u(max{v − p, 0})]
]
.
As in Lemma 3, the dependence on S and S, respectively, is limited to values in
V ∩ [0, v). Since we assume inductively that S(p) ≥ S(p) for all p ∈ V ∩ [0, v), the
distribution over spot market utilities under F is stochastically dominated by
the distribution under F , for agents with value v. Since F additionally increases
risk aversion relative to F , fixing v, we conclude that weakly fewer agents with
value v would choose to reserve under F relative to F . That is, T (p) ≥ T (p).
Then, since
S(p) = 1−Q (1− F (p) + T (p))
and
S(p) = 1−Q
(
1− F (p) + T (p)
)
we can immediately conclude S(p) ≤ S(p) as well. The desired result then follows
by induction.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 1: that the welfare of the spot+reservation
mechanism is greater than the welfare of the spot-only mechanism. LetWELq(M)
be the welfare of mechanism M at fixed supply q. Then we can write the total
welfare of M as
WEL(M) = Eq∼Q [WELq(M)] (3)
Write wvii (p) for the welfare generated by an agent paying price p, hence
wvii (p) = ui(vi − p) + p. Note that wi(p) is monotone non-decreasing in p, since
ui is a concave non-decreasing function with u
′
i(0) = 1.
Let pss(q) be the price in the spot-only mechanism M
s if the realization of
supply is q, and ps+rs (q) the spot price in spot and reservation mechanismM
s+r.
Note that ps+rs (q) ≥ p
s
s(q) for all q, no matter how the buyers behave. This is
because pss(q) is precisely the minimal price at which a q fraction of the buyers
will purchase, and hence if ps+rs (q) < p
s
s(q) then more than a q fraction of buyers
must be purchasing in M s+r (since they would buy in the spot market if they
didn’t reserve), which is impossible.
We now analyze the welfare of M s+r, breaking down the welfare generated
by those bidders who buy in the spot market and who reserve. Let Y (v) be the
fraction of bidders with value v who reserve. Then
WELq(M
s+r) =
∑
v≤ps+rs (q)
wvi (pr)Y (v)f(v) (4)
+
∑
v>p
s+r
s (q)
(
wvi (p
s+r
s (q))(1 − Y (v)) + w
v
i (pr)Y (v)
)
f(v). (5)
Note the split between the two summations at ps+rs (q). Agents with val-
ues below ps+rs (q) are served only if they reserve, whereas agents with values
above ps+rs (q) are served whether or not they reserve — the only question for
their welfare is whether they pay pr or p
s+r
s . Call each of these summations
WEL−q (M
s+r) and WEL+q (M
s+r) respectively.
We now consider the welfare from a benchmark, Bs+r. For a given supply q,
if agents reserve and have values above ps+rs (q), we assume that they pay the
spot price ps+rs (q) instead of the reservation price pr. For agents who reserve
with values below the spot price ps+rs (q), we assume they pay the spot price
ps+rs (q) and (magically) get no utility or disutility from doing so, hence the
only welfare generated is the welfare the designer experiences from the payment:
wzi (p
s+r
s (q)) = p
s+r
s (q).
As we did for the combined mechanism, we can write the welfare of the
benchmark as
WELq(B
s+r) =WEL−q (B
s+r) +WEL+q (B
s+r),
where WEL−q (B
s+r) denotes the contribution to welfare from bidders with val-
ues below ps+rs (q), andWEL
−
q (B
s+r) is the contribution to welfare from bidders
with values above ps+rs (q). For bidders with values below the spot price, we have
WEL−q (B
s+r) =
∑
v≤ps+rs (q)
ps+rs (q)Y (v)f(v)
=ps+rs (q)T (p
s+r
s (q))
The last line followed because T (ps+rs (q)) is exactly the volume of agents
with value at most ps+rs (q), hence T (p
s+r
s (q)) =
∑
v≤ps+rs (q)
Y (v)f(v). For the
bidders with values above the spot price, the welfare satisfies
WEL+q (B
s+r) =
∑
v>p
s+r
s (q)
wvi (p
s+r
s (q))f(v).
Whether or not the benchmark welfare for agents with values above the spot
price is above or below the actual welfare depends on whether the spot price
is above or below the reservation price. But, as the following claim shows, the
welfare benchmark will be less in expectation than the actual welfare:
Claim.
Eq∼Q
[
WELq(M
s+r)
]
≥ Eq∼Q
[
WELq(B
s+r)
]
(6)
Proof. The expected payment from every agent who reserves in Bs+r isEq∼Q[p
s+r
s (q)],
which by assumption satisfies Eq∼Q[p
s+r
s (q)] ≤ pr. Thus the total revenue in the
mechanism M s+r is greater than in the benchmark Bs+r.
For all agents who do reserve, we know their utility from reserving is more
than their utility if they had not reserved and only participated in the spot
market, ur(vi, ui) ≥ u
s(vi, ui). The utilities of all agents who do not reserve are
the same in both, so they are indifferent.
Summing the utilities of all the agents and the revenue of the designer gives
Eq∼Q
[
WELq(M
s+r)
]
≥ Eq∼Q
[
WELq(B
s+r)
]
.
We now argue that the welfare of the benchmark is an upper bound on the
welfare from the spot-only mechanism.
Claim.
WELq(B
s+r) ≥WELq(M
s) (7)
Proof. The agents who purchase in M s are precisely those with values above
pss(q), the spot price for the spot-only mechanism. Consider separately the agents
with values above and below the spot price ps+rs (q) for the combined mechanism.
Agents with values above ps+rs (q) are always allocated in the benchmark and
the spot-only mechanism. As the spot price (and hence benchmark payment) is
higher in the spot+reservation mechanism than the spot-only mechanism for a
given supply, and wi is non-decreasing in p, wi(p
s+r
s (q)) ≥ wi(p
s
s(q)), thus
∑
v>p
s+r
s (q)
wvi (p
s
s(q))f(v) ≤
∑
v>p
s+r
s (q)
wvi p
s+r
s (q)f(v)
=WEL+q (B
s+r). (8)
Consider now agents with values below ps+rs (q). If the agent does not reserve
in the spot+reservation mechanism, then we know that the price paid in the
benchmark is higher than the welfare generated from receiving the item: vi ≤
ps+rs (q), hence we know that w
z
i (p
s
s(q)) ≤ p
s+r
s (q). Recall that T (p
s+r
s (q)) is the
volume of agents with values below ps+rs (q) who reserve. Thus,
∑
v|ps
s
(q)<v≤ps+rs (q)
wzi (p
s
s(q))f(v) ≤
∑
v|ps
s
(q)<v≤ps(q)
ps+rs (q)f(v) (9)
= ps+rs (q)(S(p
s+r
s (q))− S(p
s
s(q)))
≤ ps+rs (q)T (p
s+r
s (q)) (10)
=WEL−q (B
s+r). (11)
Combining equations (11) and (8) gives:
WELq(M
s) ≤WEL+q (B
s+r) +WEL−q (B
s+r)
=WELq(B
s+r),
our desired result.
We can now combine the bounds from Claim A.2 and Claim A.2 to show
that the welfare of the spot and reservation mechanism M s+r is greater than
the welfare of the spot-only mechanism, M s, completing the proof of Theorem
1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). Taking expectation over the supply and using the claims
above, we have
WEL(M s) ≤WEL(Bs+r) ≤WEL(M s+r)
as desired.
